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Households in developing countries are typically more vulnerable to illness 
episodes. This paper uses a panel micro data set from Indonesia to investigate 
whether households are able to smooth their consumption against idiosyncratic 
health shocks and to examine the mitigating effects of a social health insurance 
programme for the poor on such shocks. We find that Indonesian households 
manage to keep consumption smooth after deterioration in adult health. These 
findings are robust to various health measures and different specifications. The 
difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator shows a marginal effect of the 
insurance programme on insuring household consumption from major health 
problems. Further investigation reveals heterogeneous effects of the social 
insurance programme. While it plays a trivial role in protecting rural 
households, the effect of the health intervention is stronger in urban areas of 
the country. We argue that supply-side factors seem to be partly responsible for 
this finding.  
 
Keywords: consumption smoothing, health shocks, social health 
insurance 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The provision of equitable access to health care for all people has 
become a global and national development agenda after the 
implementation of the United Nations resolution on universal health 
coverage (UHC) in December 2012. Social health insurance which 
provides protection to the beneficiary against health events is a usual 
instrument of government to achieve this ambitious goal. Yet, in the 
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context of developing countries, it is the seminal contribution of 
Murdoch in 1995 that challenges the net benefits of formal insurance to 
society. He argues that individuals and households in this economy are 
able to cope with any type of income risks as a result of the availability 
of sophisticated risk-coping strategies among themselves.  
 
Under the assumption that households are risk aversion, Chetty and 
Looney (2006) derive a simple model of risk and insurance to show that 
the welfare gains of social insurance in a low-income economy, indeed, 
come from its capability in eliminating the use of costly risk 
management techniques by households when they cope with income 
shocks, such as reduction in human capital investments. The authors 
further conclude that the understanding of why and how households 
smooth their consumption is imperative in assessing the welfare effects 
of social insurance programmes.  
 
The main objectives of this paper are therefore to advance research on 
the risk and formal insurance debate. The first part of the study will 
revisit consumption insurance in the presence of unintended health 
events. There are at least three important caveats to keep in mind when 
addressing this issue. A primary concern is how to find a proper health 
measure. A widely used health measure is self-reported health status. 
Despite the merit of this measure to predict subsequent mortality among 
adults and closely relate to productivity, self-reported measures of health 
are subject to measurement errors. Basically, this can happen due to 
different health valuations among individuals even though they have the 
same level of health in reality. The differences in socioeconomic status 
to some extent explain this health assessment gap. Interestingly, better 
educated and higher income persons are more likely to report that they 
have some health problems (Strauss and Thomas, 1995; Currie and 
Madrian, 1999; Lindeboom and van Doorslaer, 2004). 
 
Gertler and Gruber (2002) suggest that limitations to perform activities 
of daily living (ADLs) provide a better alternative to reflect health 
changes since they are more objective. The two earlier studies that 
employ this health measure show that households in Indonesia are only 
able to smooth their consumption when they cope with mild health 
shocks, but they fail to smooth consumption against severer health risks 
(Gertler and Gruber, 2002; Gertler et al., 2009). Nevertheless, it is 
further confirmed that the ADLs measures are more suitable for older 
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populations (Genoni, 2012). For this reason, we complement the ADLs 
with two additional health indices, that is, illness symptoms and a drop 
in body mass index (BMI).  
 
The next issue is related to the presence of unobservable variables 
leading to co-movement between consumption and health. For example, 
extreme drought may affect production and consumption, and it may 
also change health status because of the variation in the disease 
environment. A widely-accepted procedure for dealing with these 
problems is to include community fixed effects. Given the panel 
structure of our dataset, we also apply a fixed effect strategy to account 
for these omitted factors. 
 
The last challenge is that the endogeneity of health itself. As pointed out 
by Gertler and Gruber (2002), the ADLs measures, however, can 
identify different types of acute exogenous health problems that are 
correlated with changes in labour market outcomes and consumption 
decisions. Therefore, these measures considerably do a good job in 
addressing the possibility of reverse causality between consumption and 
health. 
 
While existing studies in this literature have largely focused on 
understanding the theory of risk-sharing within groups such households 
and communities, we add one important feature to distinguish this paper 
from them by examining the role of a social health insurance 
programme in protecting household consumption against health 
changes. In particular, we investigate whether beneficiaries of a social 
health insurance programme are protected from the negative effects of 
health shocks on the degree of consumption smoothing before and after 
the introduction of the programme. Therefore, our study relies on a 
difference-in-differences (DiD) approach. 
 
To do so, we use the introduction of the Indonesian Askeskin in 2005, a 
publicly-financed health insurance programme for the poor. The 
programme was targeted to poor households. Beneficiaries of the 
programme are entitled to fully-subsidised health care services in 
primary health facilities and public hospitals. Given its very generous 
coverage, Askeskin can reasonably be expected to not only have an 
imperative effect on the consumption of medical care (Sparrow et al., 
2013), but also on the consumption of other budget items, such as 
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transportation, electricity, and other costs related to the care of a sick 
household member at home (Wagstaff, 2010). This implies that the 
Askeskin programme could have an important role on consumption 
insurance during the health crisis. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses 
the formal model of risk-sharing and reviews some empirical evidence 
in this area. Section 3 describes health insurance systems in Indonesia 
and the Askeskin programme. Section 4 gives an overview of the 
Indonesian data and health measures. Section 5 discusses the estimation 
strategy and limitations of the study. Section 5 presents the main 
findings and a variety of sensitivity tests. Section 6 concludes.   
 
2. Consumption Smoothing: Theories and Empirical Evidence 
 
The model of consumption smoothing predicts that the level of 
household consumption solely responds to the realisation of aggregate 
risks instead of idiosyncratic risks (e.g. illness, changes in household 
income). While households still have to carry some risk, they share this 
exposure within their respective groups, implying that the marginal 
utility of consumption is strongly correlated across the groups. 
Achieving full consumption risk-sharing within a group (i.e. households 
or communities) or finding a Pareto efficient allocation of risk, however, 
is the main task of social planners because it is derived from the social 
planner problem. 
 
Let us formalise our model as Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991), 
Townsned (1994), and Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997). Basically, the 
model is built on the three following assumptions: preferences are 
additive over time and across households, consumption and leisure are 
separable, and discount rates are constant among households. Consider a 
community with 𝐽 households, households’ common information at time 
𝑡 is represented by the realisation of state of the world 𝑠𝑡 with 𝑠𝑡 ∈
{1,2, … . , 𝑆}, and 𝜋(𝑠𝑡) denotes the probability that state 𝑠𝑡 occurs. A 
social planner attempts to maximise a weighted sum of households’ 
expected lifetime utilities as follows: 
max
{𝑐𝑗𝑡(𝑠𝑡)}
∑ 𝜆𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
∑ ∑ 𝜌𝑡
𝑆
𝑠𝑡=1
∞
𝑡=1
𝜋(𝑠𝑡)𝑢𝑗[𝑐𝑗𝑡(𝑠𝑡), 𝛿𝑗𝑡(𝑠𝑡)]                                       (1) 
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where 𝑐𝑗𝑡  indicates the level of consumption of household 𝑗 at time 𝑡, 𝜆𝑗 
is the planner’s weight of household 𝑗 satisfying 0 < 𝜆𝑗 < 1,  𝛿𝑗𝑡(𝑠𝑡) 
represents a preference shock, and 𝜌𝑡 is the rate of time preference.   
 
The feasible budget constraint is that the aggregate community 
consumption has to be less than or equal to the aggregate community 
endowment (income) for each time and each state, or 
∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑡(𝑠𝑡)
𝐽
𝑗=1
≤ ∑ 𝑦𝑗𝑡(𝑠𝑡), ∀𝑠𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1
, ∀𝑡                                                                    (2) 
 
The Pareto-efficient allocation of risk within the community is solved by 
the standard optimisation of the first order conditions to yield a solution 
as: 
 
𝜆𝑗𝑢
′[𝑐𝑗𝑡(𝑠𝑡), 𝛿𝑗(𝑠𝑡)] =
?̂?(𝑠𝑡), ∀𝑠𝑡 , ∀𝑡                                                                                             (3)  
 
where ?̂?(𝑠𝑡) =
𝜇(𝑠𝑡)
𝜌𝑡𝜋(𝑠𝑡)
, and ?̂?𝑡 is the Lagrange multiplier measuring the 
aggregate community constraints in period 𝑡. Therefore, given the 
Pareto weights and aggregate community consumption, the marginal 
utility is equalised across households. 
 
Assume now that each risk-averse household has a constant absolute 
risk aversion (CARA) utility function as: 
 
𝑢𝑗[𝑐𝑗𝑡(𝑠𝑡), 𝛿𝑗𝑡(𝑠𝑡)] = −
1
𝜎
exp [−𝜎(𝑐𝑗𝑡(𝑠𝑡) − 𝛿𝑗𝑡(𝑠𝑡)], 𝜎
> 0                                                                                 (4) 
 
where 𝜎 is the Arrow-Pratt measure of constant absolute risk aversion. 
When we substitute equation (3) into (4) and take logarithms, it follows 
that the level of consumption of household 𝑗 at time 𝑡 is: 
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𝐶𝑗𝑡(𝑠𝑡) = [−
1
𝜎
] 𝑙𝑜𝑔?̂?(𝑠𝑡) + [
1
𝜎
] 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜆𝑗
+ 𝛿𝑗𝑡(𝑠𝑡)                                                                         (5) 
 
The aggregation of equation (5) over all households in the community 
gives: 
𝐶𝑗𝑡(𝑠𝑡) = 𝐶?̅?(𝑠𝑡) + [
1
𝜎
] [𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜆𝑗 − ?̅?] + [𝛿𝑗𝑡(𝑠𝑡)
− 𝛿?̅?(𝑠𝑡)]                                                                (6) 
 
where 
𝐶?̅?(𝑠𝑡) =
1
𝐽
∑ 𝐶𝑗𝑡(𝑠𝑡)
𝐽
𝑗=1
          ?̅? =
1
𝐽
∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝜆𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
            𝛿?̅?(𝑠𝑡)
=
1
𝐽
∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑡(𝑠𝑡)
𝐽
𝑗=1
 
 
Alternatively, a more convenient way to express equation (6) is in the 
form of the first difference operator as: 
 
∆𝐶𝑗𝑡(𝑠𝑡) = ∆𝐶?̅?(𝑠𝑡) + [∆𝛿𝑗𝑡(𝑠𝑡)
− ∆𝛿?̅?(𝑠𝑡)]                                                            (7) 
 
The key implication of equation (7) is: when the assumption of full 
consumption insurance continues to hold, and we are able to control for 
the changes in the aggregate community consumption, idiosyncratic 
income risks that are uncorrelated with preference shifts should not 
determine the growth rate of household consumption. 
 
A large number of empirical studies testing the above model show 
mixed results. A first strand of literature has reached a strong consensus 
that there is partial consumption smoothing (Townsend, 1994; Kochar, 
1995; Skoufias and Quisumbing, 2005; Islam and Maitra, 2012). In 
contrast, some papers reject the model of full consumption insurance 
and suggest that households cannot manage to maintain their 
consumption constant in the face of health shocks (Dercon and 
Krishnan, 2000; Wagstaff, 2010; Beegle et al., 2008; Linnemayr, 2010). 
Another study highlights the heterogeneity of consumption smoothing 
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with respect to different economic strata and the degree of shocks. A 
study in rural China by Jalan and Ravallion (1999) concludes that 
wealthier households are better able to isolate the negative impact of 
health shocks than poorer households. Mohanan (2013) takes advantage 
of exogenous variation in exposure to health shocks due to bus accidents 
in India to reveal evidence of consumption smoothing for basic needs 
(food, housing, festivals) but this does not apply to education spending. 
His study which employs a quasi-experimental study design further 
shows that Indian households demand for borrowing and debt as the 
coping strategies to protect consumption from health shocks.  
 
In the context of Indonesia, a pioneering paper by Gertler and Gruber 
(2002) confirms that households can only smooth consumption against 
mild health shocks, but they fail to smooth consumption in the presence 
of severe health risks. A recent study of Genoni (2012), however, has 
challenged these findings. She focuses on finding an exogenous source 
of variation in health and uses changes in the prices of health inputs as 
the instruments for the ADLs. This research points to the existence of 
full consumption insurance. She explains that this is made possible by 
intra-household labour substitution and inter-household transfers. The 
study warns that loosening the problems of reverse causality and omitted 
variables may result in different outcomes. 
 
Gertler et al. (2009) extent Gertler and Gruber's analysis and question 
whether access to microfinance institutions helps households cope with 
serious health problems. They do emphasize the benefits of 
microfinance programmes in insuring consumption. Using different 
household survey datasets, Sparrow et al. (2014) strengthen these 
findings to conclude that poor households in rural areas of Indonesia 
rely on informal coping mechanisms when exposed to major health 
changes. Borrowing and depleting assets along with informal support 
from extended families become significant risk-sharing instruments 
among the poor.  
 
That the informal risk-sharing arrangement plays a central role in 
household strategies raises some concerns about the effectiveness of 
formal health insurance programmes. This type of programmes could 
potentially crowd out the existing informal strategies and could make 
others worse-off. This becomes increasingly important if the 
implementation of the social health insurance programme does not 
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provide universal coverage. For instance, there are only some 
households from a private group-based informal risk-sharing 
arrangement fully covered by a social health insurance programme. 
These protected households have an incentive to break down the 
arrangement and leave unprotected households more vulnerable to 
shocks. Under the circumstances, a community base health insurance 
offers greater advantages than individual protection (Dercon, 2002).  
 
3. The Indonesian Health Insurance System and Askeskin 
 
The setting for our analysis is the Indonesian health insurance situation 
during the period 2000-2007. Prior to the National Social Security 
System reforms in late 2004, the Indonesian health insurance market 
targeted formal sector workers through the establishment of health 
insurance for both civil servants (Askes) and private sector employees 
(Jamsostek). Although the membership of Askes and Jamsostek is 
mandatory, these occupational health insurance schemes are not 
comparable in some aspects. Unlike Askes, Jamsostek does not cover 
catastrophic health treatments. The other special feature of Jamsostek is 
that it offers an opt-out clause. Therefore, private companies are allowed 
to utilise another scheme as long as it can provide (at least) equal 
protections as Jamsostek does. Based on the National Socioeconomic 
Survey (Susenas) data in 2007, it was reported that Askes and Jamsostek 
only covered about 6.00 per cent and 2.00 per cent of the population. 
Yet, this coverage is relatively large compared to the share of private 
insurance companies and other schemes, accounting for approximately 
3.00 per cent of the population in the same period (Rokx et al., 2009). 
 
Apart from the abovementioned health insurance programmes, the 
government of Indonesia, indeed, has also encouraged community 
participation in maintaining and financing their own health care. This 
effort has been promoted since the early 1970s by the introduction of a 
voluntary community-based health programme (known as Dana Sehat). 
Dana Sehat primarily covers farmers, fishermen, and students in the 
rural areas of Indonesia. The scheme allows households to pay the 
premium either in cash or in-kind to the bank or the committee of Dana 
Sehat. Since 1994, the central government has initiated to protect the 
poor by means of a health card programme, allowing card holders to 
obtain free services in all public health facilities. Following the 1997-
1998 Asian economic crisis, a social safety net programme in the health 
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sector (known as JPS-BK) was launched. The JPS-BK programme 
provides free basic health care and finances various maternal and child 
health care services to eligible poor households (Hirose, 2008).  
 
Under a new government’s social security system flagship, Indonesia 
introduced a mandatory social health insurance for the poor (known as 
Askeskin) in 2005. The programme was intended to increase access to 
health care services for low-income families. Although the government 
fully subsidises the monthly premium of Rp. 5,000 (approximately USD 
0.55) per participant, beneficiaries of Askeskin are entitled to very 
generous health care benefits. These include free outpatient primary care 
in the primary health centres (Puskesmas) and free inpatient care in the 
third class at a public hospital. It also provides special health care 
services, such as obstetric care services, mobile health services, 
immunisation, and pharmaceuticals. Askeskin was able to extend its 
health service coverage to reach remote areas and isolated islands of the 
country. 
 
The selection of Askeskin beneficiaries used a combination of 
geographic (district) and individual targeting. The central government 
determined the Askeskin quotas for each district based on poverty data 
from the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS). Village leaders took 
responsibility to trace the poor and proposed their names to the district 
governments. In other words, eligible individuals were selected at the 
district level in principle. 
 
However, Askeskin was confronted with some difficulties in the initial 
phase of its implementation. For example, to identify eligible 
beneficiaries, some districts preferred to use the household welfare 
criteria suggested by the National Family Planning Coordinating Board 
(BKKBN) rather than the poverty criteria of BPS. Another concern is 
that people could use the JPS-BK health cards and village poverty letters 
(SKTM) to claim the Askeskin benefit package because of the delay in 
the distribution of Askeskin cards. Moreover, some individuals refused 
to take part in the programme because they had to bear some indirect 
costs (e.g. the cost of making a picture for the membership card) and 
had to undergo long-distance travel to reach health facilities (Sparrow et 
al., 2013). 
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In 2005, BPS renewed the database of poor households by conducting a 
social economics data survey (known as PSE-05).  Poor households 
were classified on the basis of fourteen components, measuring different 
aspects of household well-being, such as housing materials, the use of 
sanitary systems, access to clean water, nutrient intake, ownership of 
durable assets, and labour force participation. A weight was assigned to 
each dimension. Subsequently, a household poverty index was 
calculated by summing up all those fourteen components. The possible 
index scores ranged from 0 to 1, where a value of 1 indicated the most 
impoverished households. In accordance with this new index, 
households were divided into four strata: very poor, poor, near poor and 
non-poor households wherein the first three groups were eligible for 
Askeskin.  
 
Askeskin was targeted to cover 36.1 million poor people in the first 
year. In fact, it covered 60 million beneficiaries with the total actual 
costs amounted to approximately Rp. 3.6 trillion. Askeskin was renamed 
into Jamkesmas or health insurance for the entire population in 2008. It 
was estimated to reach about 35 per cent of the population 
(approximately 76.4 million beneficiaries). Jamkesmas, however, 
became the rudiment of the Indonesian universal health care by 2015 
(Hirose, 2008; Rokx et al., 2009). 
 
4. Data and Health Measures 
 
We use the last two-wave panels of the Indonesian Family Life Survey 
(IFLS) in this study.
3
 The IFLS is an ongoing longitudinal survey 
representing 83 per cent of the Indonesian population. The sampling 
design of the survey is stratified based on provinces and urban-rural 
areas. The sample consists of 321 enumeration areas that are randomly 
selected within 13 provinces. The random selection of households in 
each enumeration area makes use of a representative sampling frame 
from Susenas of the BPS. 
The third wave of the IFLS survey administered in 2000 was able to 
contact over 10,400 households. This dataset serves as the baseline data 
for our study. In 2007, the IFLS4 survey successfully interviewed more 
                                                          
3
 We use additional data from the second wave of the survey to construct the health measures 
and the consumption variable. 
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than 13,500 households, retaining over 95 per cent of the households 
from the previous wave. 
 
The IFLS collects detailed micro-level data at the individual and 
household levels. The consumption module, which records 37 food and 
19 non-food items, makes great efforts in order to obtain accurate values 
of household consumption. Each household was asked explicitly to 
recall both monetary expenditures on these items and transactions 
involving consumption from own production. A new module collecting 
information on assistance from public transfer programmes helps us to 
identify beneficiaries of Askeskin.  
 
The extensive documentation of the health module allows us to generate 
multiple health shock measures. The first measure is a dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 if the household head reported illness symptoms 
during the past 4 weeks of the survey. Our self-reported illness 
symptoms reflect not only minor health problems (e.g. headache, 
coughing, fever, etc) but also severer health problems (e.g. heart disease, 
diabetes, and hypertension). The change in illness symptoms will be 0 if 
the household head does not move from ill to healthy or vice versa, 1 if 
the household head shifts from reporting illness to not having any illness 
symptoms, and -1 if the household head changes his/her health valuation 
from healthy to ill.  
 
A well-trained nurse records various measures of physical health for 
each household member, including his/her height and weight. This 
enables us to calculate a household head’s body mass index (BMI), a 
more objective measure of health. It is equal to weight (in kilograms) 
divided by height (in metres) squared. We define a BMI shock if the 
heads’ BMI changes exceed one standard deviation of the BMI-change 
distribution. We generate a dummy variable indicating that the head 
experiences a sizeable drop in BMI. As the variant of anthropometric 
measures, BMI is clearly related to energy intake which varies over the 
life course. It may capture both longer and shorter term dimensions of 
nutritional status. It has also been proven that BMI embodies the 
maximum physical capacity independent of energy intake. Hence, for 
some jobs that require sustained physical efforts, it is an important 
pathway through which health may influence worker’s productivity. On 
the contrary, this claim seems to be less relevant for many jobs that do 
not need maximum physical efforts (Strauss and Thomas, 1998).  
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Our final health measure is a change in the index of activities of daily 
living (ADLs) which represents a change in a person’s functional 
status.
4
 It diagnoses 2 limitations in personal care (i.e. ability to bathe 
and dress) and 8 limitations in a range of motion activities (i.e. walk a 
kilometre and 5 kilometres; bow, squat, and kneel; sweep; stand up from 
sitting on the floor; get up from a sitting position on a chair; draw a pail 
of water; and carry a heavy load). The severity of each activity 
limitation is represented by three codes, a value of 1 denotes can do it 
easily, 3 if can do it with difficulty, and 5 if unable to do it. We generate 
a ADLs index for a person based on a scoring algorithm of the RAND 
Medical Outcomes Study (RAND-MOS) with the possible values 
ranging from 0 to 1.
5
 It takes a value of 1 if the individual can perform 
all ADL items without any difficulties, and zero if the individual cannot 
perform any ADL items. A change in the ADLs index represents the 
change in the ADLs index value from the previous period. 
 
5. Identification Strategy and the Limitation of the Study 
 
The main hypothesis to be tested in this paper is whether households 
exposed to the Askeskin programme are better able to smooth their 
consumption against unexpected health shocks. The baseline empirical 
specification, thus, resembles the key idea of a difference-in-differences 
(DiD) model as follows: 
 
 Cjct  =  α + β1At + β2HIjc + β3Hjct + β4(At ∗ HIjc) + β5(At ∗ Hjct)
+ β6(HIjc ∗ Hjct) + β7(At ∗ HIjc ∗ Hjct) + ∑ β8Xjct
k
+ εjct                                                                                   (8) 
 
where Cjct is the change in log (non-medical care) consumption per 
capita for household j in community c at time t.
6 
 At is equal to 1 when 
year is 2007. The dummy variable HIjc is the participation status of the 
                                                          
4
 The fourth wave of the IFLS survey collected 13 ADL items, and 5 new items as the measures 
of the instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs). To maintain consistency, we only use 10 
ADL items collecting in all survey rounds. 
5
 The ADLs index for person 𝑖 is calculated as the following: 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖 =
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖−𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒−𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒
 
6
 We deflate the nominal value of the consumption data by using the World Development 
Indicators’s urban consumer price index series. It is in fixed 2005 prices. 
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household in the Askeskin programme. We define the treatment 
household if at least one member of the household is covered by 
Askeskin. The coefficient of β3,  measuring the idiosyncratic health 
shocks, should be equal to zero if there is consumption smoothing. In 
other words, health shocks will not affect the growth in consumption. β4 
captures the average treatment effect of Askeskin on consumption 
growth. The coefficient of β5 indicates the further effect of health 
shocks for uninsured households. β6 explains the differences in the 
change in consumption due to the variability in health shocks between 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the Askeskin programme. β7 is 
the coefficient of interest. It measures whether participation in the 
Askeskin programme enables the household to better able to insure 
against health shocks. If the Askeskin programme does enhance 
benefits, the coefficient β7 should be positive and statistically 
significantly different from zero. A vector of covariates to control for 
secular trends and seasonal variability, Xjct,  includes the household 
head’s and spouse’s age and education, the change in household 
composition, and the agricultural household. The last term, εict, is the 
error term.  
 
Our first concern with estimating equation (9) is the presence of state 
dependency. If there is state dependency, the shape of the utility 
function and the consumption function will vary with health status 
despite in the state of full insurance. That is to say that the state of health 
is correlated with preference shifts and thus with the disturbance term, 
leading to biased coefficient estimates (Cochrane, 1991; Gertler and 
Gruber, 2002). Furthermore, Finkelstein et al. (2009) point out that the 
presence of state dependence could also lead to a false assessment of the 
true benefits of health insurance. In the case of positive state 
dependence, a decline in the marginal utility of consumption following 
negative health shocks (e.g. additional consumption on transport costs 
due to hospital visit), the benefits of health insurance would tend to 
underestimate the true benefits. In contrast, the overestimation of health 
insurance benefits would become plausible under negative state 
dependence. To test the likelihood of the shift in household preferences 
is due to the illness of the head, we include spouses’ health measures in 
our model.  We expect that the inclusion of these measures will not 
affect household consumption (Gertler and Gruber, 2002).  
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Another critical methodological challenge is the classical endogeneity 
problem in health status. Although our self-reported ADLs composite 
index is less prone to this simultaneity bias, the other subjective health 
measure (i.e. illness symptom) may offer better health assessments. The 
intuition is the following: while measurement errors in self-reported 
health bring a downward bias to the estimated coefficient on health, the 
endogeneity of self-reported health status tends to give an upwardly 
biased coefficient. Therefore, given the opposite direction of the bias, it 
will cancel each other out and yield a valid estimate of the coefficient 
(Bound, 1991). We combine both subjective and objective health 
measures to evaluate the consistency of our results. 
 
A further exercise is devoted to examine income effect arising from the 
introduction of the Indonesian unconditional cash transfers programme 
(BLT henceforth) in the second semester of 2005. Since this social 
protection programme is also targeted to poor households, we anticipate 
any potential confounding effects between the two interventions by 
performing an additional analysis without including beneficiaries of 
BLT. 
 
The aforementioned empirical strategy, however, leaves us with one 
major limitation because we are unable to hold the assumption of the 
DiD method. The validity of the difference-in-differences method rests 
on the assumption that the implementation of Askeskin is not driven by 
the pre-existing differences in the ability of households to insure their 
consumption against illness. This assumption is more likely to be 
violated in our context. Beneficiaries of Askeskin are the poor. By 
nature, this group is arguably more vulnerable to unexpected shocks. By 
directly comparing the outcomes of the two groups, our results would 
overestimate the true impact of the Askeskin programme. Yet the 
availability of the dataset prevents us from controlling for such 
differences in the pre-programme observable characteristics between the 
insured and uninsured groups. 
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6. Results 
 
6.1 Sample Description 
 
Before going further into the estimation results, we take a look at the 
data first. We restrict our sample to younger heads (below 66 years old) 
since they are more likely to actively participate in the labour market, 
and a serious illness will cause them to lose more income. Table 1 
presents means, standard deviations for the characteristics of the sample. 
The data sets are presented for three groups: the entire sample, 
uninsured and insured households. The results of the table show a few 
differences between the characteristics of households with Askeskin and 
those are not. Specifically, households covered by the health insurance 
programme tend to have lower levels of non-medical consumption per 
capita, a larger household size, and approximately half of them are the 
recipients of the unconditional cash transfers programme (i.e. BLT). 
Looking at the characteristics of household heads and their spouses, 
lower levels of educational attainment and a less favourable change in 
body mass index for the insured group are also noticed. We raise some 
doubts about the validity of our self-reported illness symptoms because 
the lion’s share of the two groups reported a change in illness symptoms 
between the two survey periods. Using a different data set, Gertler and 
Gruber (2002) also find that more than half Indonesian people reported 
an illness symptom in the survey. They conclude this evidence as an 
indication that people take into account many small health problems that 
do not need expensive medical treatment. 
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Table 1.  Descriptive statistics of the characteristics of uninsured and insured 
households 
 
Variable All Uninsured Insured 
log of HH non-medical consumption 6.5582 6.6242 6.2338 
 
(1.3531) (1.3711) (1.2106) 
log of HH size 1.7644 1.7584 1.7940 
 
(0.3835) (0.3845) (0.3772) 
Female head of HH 0.0111 0.0102 0.0157 
 
(0.1049) (0.1004) (0.1245) 
HH covered by BLT 0.1910 0.1277 0.5021 
 
(0.3931) (0.3338) (0.5004) 
Head's characteristics: 
   
Age 47.0375 46.8874 47.7754 
 
(8.9287) (8.9153) (8.9644) 
The highest level of education: primary school 
0.5155 0.4905 0.6381 
(0.4998) (0.5000) (0.4809) 
The highest level of education: lower secondary school 
0.0851 0.0864 0.0787 
(0.2791) (0.2810) (0.2694) 
The highest level of education: upper secondary school 
0.1632 0.1760 0.1001 
(0.3696) (0.3809) (0.3004) 
The highest level of education: tertiary school 
0.0670 0.0774 0.0157 
(0.2500) (0.2673) (0.1245) 
Work in agriculture 0.3835 0.3713 0.4435 
 
(0.4863) (0.4832) (0.4972) 
Health status measures: 
   
Change in ADL index 0.0025 0.0022 0.0038 
 
(0.0851) (0.0840) (0.0903) 
BMI drop 0.3482 0.3360 0.4077 
 
(0.4764) (0.4724) (0.4918) 
Change in illness symptoms 0.7427 0.7402 0.7554 
 
(0.4372) (0.4386) (0.4302) 
Spouse's characteristics: 
   
Age 41.8066 41.7713 41.9800 
 
(9.3340) (9.2907) (9.5491) 
The highest level of education: primary school 
0.5172 0.4993 0.6052 
(0.4998) (0.5001) (0.4892) 
The highest level of education: lower secondary school 
0.0962 0.1021 0.0672 
(0.2949) (0.3029) (0.2506) 
The highest level of education: upper secondary school 
0.1151 0.1283 0.0501 
(0.3192) (0.3345) (0.2182) 
The highest level of education: tertiary school 
0.0418 0.0474 0.0143 
(0.2002) (0.2126) (0.1188) 
 
Health status measures: 
   Change in ADL index  -0.0086 -0.0088 -0.0077 
 
(0.0932) (0.0906) (0.1053) 
Observations 4136 3437 699 
 
Notes: N=4136. Non-medical consumption is in Rupiah. Mean from IFLS3 and IFLS4. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses.  
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We now turn our attention to the patterns of health care expenditures. 
Households with critical and immediate medical needs have to spend a 
large share of their budget for health care if they are not covered by any 
health insurance programmes. Table 2 shows that the budget share of 
health care expenditure raises with the average monthly total household 
expenditure, implying a positive income elasticity of health 
expenditures.
7
 It is further revealed that the share of health care 
expenditures across expenditure quintiles fairly decreased between 2000 
and 2007 (from 1.97 per cent to 1.89 per cent respectively). There are at 
least three main reasons to explain this finding. First, perhaps the growth 
in non-medical expenditure was faster than the growth in medical 
expenditure. Second, there was a substantial decline in health care 
spending. Since it is the product of prices and quantities, this reduction 
means that households pay lower prices (a price effect) due to the 
Askeskin intervention. Lastly, this indicates that households either 
utilise less health care services or, very unlikely, experience less illness.  
 
Table 2. The distribution of monthly health expenditures by  
expenditure groups (percent) 
 
  percent of total expenditure percent of non-food expenditure 
  2000 2007 2000 2007 
Quintile1(poorest)  1.342 1.351 3.829 3.943 
Quintile2 1.899 1.538 4.719 4.075 
Quintile3 2.005 1.598 4.459 3.856 
Quintile4 2.38 2.028 4.993 4.375 
Quintile5 (richest) 3.443 2.485 5.39 4.658 
Rural 1.708 1.92 4.43 4.579 
Urban 2.117 2.022 4.434 3.976 
Total  1.97 1.888 4.431 4.281 
 
To have a clearer view of the trend in the health care expenditures 
around the reform, Figure 1 gives the plots of health care expenditure 
per capita before and after the introduction of Askeskin between the 
uninsured and insured groups. The two figures show that the 
                                                          
7
 In low-income countries, it is more preferable to express financial burden of health as the share 
of non-food instead of food expenditures because the latter accounts for a large fraction of the 
poor’s consumption basket (O'Donnell et al., 2007).  
62  The Consumption-Health Nexus Revisited:  
 Examining the Benefits of Social Insurance for the Poor in Indonesia 
 
distributions of health care expenditure per capita for all households 
have markedly shifted to the right after the reform, signifying an 
increase in the demand for health care services. Nevertheless, the pattern 
has been less obvious for the insured group in the bottom of the health 
expenditure distribution.  
 
Figure 1. Density of (log) health care expenditures per capita of the uninsured 
and insured groups before and after the Introduction of Askeskin 
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selecting its beneficiaries. In 2007, Askeskin covered 61.77 per cent of 
the first two poorest consumption quintiles. Nevertheless, there were 
also sizeable leakages of benefits to the non-poor, about 8.59 per cent 
(Figure 2). Households in rural areas enjoyed higher coverage rates as 
compared to households in urban areas, about 10.59 per cent as opposed 
to 7.97 per cent. Overall, Askeskin was estimated to cover at around 
18.56 per cent of the entire sample.  
 
Figure 2.  Askeskin coverage by consumption quintile in 2007 
 
 
6.2 Baseline Results 
 
The basic consumption smoothing results are presented in Table 3. Let 
us focus first on the results for the ability of households to insure their 
consumption against health shocks. The coefficients on the three health 
measures are statistically insignificant, suggesting the existence of full 
insurance. Although the evidence does not contradict the full insurance 
model, the coefficient on illness symptoms does not show the expected 
sign, that is to say an illness is associated with higher levels of 
consumption (column 2). The finding is remarkably consistent with that 
reported by Gertler and Gruber (2002) based on a different Indonesian 
data set. They argue that the change in self-reported illness symptoms is 
weakly correlated with the change in labour-supply, and it is, therefore, 
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in BMI. Specifically, a drop in BMI would lower consumption by 
almost 3.67 per cent on average.  
 
The last two columns of Table 3 examine the impact of ADLs changes 
on the change in household consumption. We replicate a similar model 
as Gertler et al. (2009) in column 4.  We find that the coefficient on the 
ADLs index is 0.08. This implies that if an illness causes the household 
head to move from being able to perform all physical activities to being 
able to perform none of them, consumption would decrease by 7.84 per 
cent. Our result poses a challenge to the estimate of Gertler et al. (2009) 
which concludes that households are unable to insure their consumption 
as a result of the changes in ADLs. In particular, they find that 
households would reduce their consumption by almost 22 per cent. This 
noticeable difference could be related to the fact that Gertler et al. 
(2009) use the data sets collected during the financial crisis, in which it 
brought down the purchasing power of households. Our argument seems 
to be supported by Beegle et al. (1999). Utilising the same data source, 
their study shows unambiguous evidence that the crisis caused 
substantial declines in the level of household expenditure. 
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Table 3. Effects of heads’ health shocks on changes in non-medical 
consumption and mitigation by Askeskin 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
post05 0.248*** 0.305*** 0.282***  0.249*** 
 (0.0494) (0.0946) (0.0661)  (0.0535) 
Insurance -0.265*** -0.0656 -0.244**  -0.205*** 
 (0.0782) (0.165) (0.102)  (0.0779) 
post05* insurance -0.0947 -0.225 -0.141  -0.0836 
 (0.104) (0.204) (0.138)  (0.104) 
ADL    0.0784 0.121 
    (0.252) (0.385) 
ADL*insurance     -1.050 
     (0.847) 
ADL*post05     0.0221 
     (0.530) 
ADL*insurance*post05     1.444 
     (1.162) 
BMI   -0.0367   
   (0.0688)   
BMI*insurance   0.0594   
   (0.157)   
BMI*post05   -0.119   
   (0.103)   
BMI*insurance*post05   0.217   
   (0.218)   
Symptom  0.121    
  (0.0815)    
Symptom*insurance  -0.195    
  (0.186)    
Symptom*post05  -0.0654    
  (0.106)    
Symptom*insurance*post05  0.192    
  (0.238)    
Constant 6.495*** 6.272*** 6.402*** 6.315*** 6.372*** 
 (0.0336) (0.531) (0.533) (0.533) (0.531) 
N 4,136 4,136 4,136 4,136 4,136 
R-squared 0.150 0.176 0.176 0.171 0.175 
 
Notes: N=4136. Robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the household level). All 
specifications are robust to the inclusion of covariates.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Regardless of its imprecision, however, we should carefully interpret the 
coefficient of ADLs. The ADLs measures were originally developed to 
assess the health status of older adults. It is still an open question 
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whether the ADLs index is also relevant to studying the health 
conditions of younger populations. This is a very plausible reason since 
both groups react in different ways to health shocks. It is generally 
accepted that older individuals tend to experience more severe and more 
permanent health problems than younger persons. Furthermore, the 
ADLs index cannot precisely differentiate illness events in terms of their 
duration and severity, whereas these will lead to distinctive adjustment 
mechanisms. For instance, a transitory health shock is more likely to be 
insured than a longer-term illness because the former could just imply 
temporary reductions in labour supply. In a similar way, persons who 
report the same limitations in the ability to carry a heavy load for 20 
metres may suffer from very different types of illness (Genoni, 2012).  
 
We now turn to the impact of the Askeskin programme. The interaction 
between the dummy for the health insurance programme and the post-
reform dummy represents the treatment effects of Askeskin. According 
to the table, we obviously see that the impact of the programme on the 
consumption growth is not statistically different from zero. Before 
controlling for covariates, the difference-in-differences estimate shows 
that the beneficiary households had close to 9.47 per cent lower 
consumption growth than the non-beneficiary households. This 
implication remains consistent with the inclusion of the health measures. 
Notably, those who reported changes in illness symptoms seem to have 
been strongly adversely affected than the two other illnesses, in 
particular there would be a smaller rate of consumption growth with 
22.50 per cent for the Askeskin beneficiaries.  
 
Moving on to the role of Askeskin in enabling households insure against 
idiosyncratic health shocks. The mitigating effect of Askeskin on health 
shocks is captured by the interaction terms between the dummy for the 
treatment effect and each health shock measure. The results show that 
Askeskin has a trivial role in mitigating these adverse health shocks. 
However, it is notable that the estimated coefficients are all positive, 
suggesting that the participants of Askeskin have a greater ability to 
protect their consumption during illness. These findings are robust to the 
inclusion of our three health shock measures. 
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6.3 Tests for State Dependency and the Confounding Effects of the 
Unconditional Cash Transfers (BLT) 
 
As noted earlier, the model of consumption smoothing will be held if 
there is no state dependency, to the extent that health shocks will not 
change the underlying preferences of other household members. In our 
case, the illness of the head could be associated with the illness to other 
household members. Hence, the changes in household consumption 
refer to the wide changes in household tastes. We test this hypothesis by 
incorporating in our model a change in the ADLs index of the spouse. 
The inclusion of the change in the spouse’s ADLs index has neither 
effects on consumption nor substantial changes in the coefficient on the 
head’s ADLs index. The coefficient on the spouse’s ADLs index is not 
statistically significant, whereas the coefficient on the change in the 
head’s ADLs is still insignificant despite its magnitude decreases by 
almost half from 0.12 to 0.07 (Table 4 column 1). The evidence should 
not be surprising because the correlation coefficient between the illness 
of the head and the illness of the spouse is very low, around 0.06. The 
data discussion implies that the state dependency is not driving our 
findings. 
 
An alternative explanation of our baseline results could be derived from 
the confounding effects of the unconditional cash transfers (i.e. BLT) 
programme. This anti-poverty program was launched a few months 
following the commencing of Askeskin and shared identical targeting 
systems. To isolate the potential spill over effects of BLT, we exclude 
BLT-eligible households and re-estimate our models. We find that the 
coefficients on Askeskin are still insignificant, but they fall noticeably. 
As compared to the treatment effects from the baseline estimates (9.47 
per cent and 8.36 per cent), it currently varies between 4.16 per cent to 
6.14 per cent (Table 4, column 2 and 3).  
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Table 4. Tests for state dependency and confounding effects of BLT 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
post05 0.273*** 0.294*** 0.270*** 
 (0.0638) (0.0539) (0.0588) 
insurance -0.151* -0.218** -0.137 
 (0.0862) (0.101) (0.102) 
post05*insurance -0.258** -0.0416 -0.0614 
 (0.123) (0.148) (0.148) 
ADL 0.0677  0.162 
 (0.533)  (0.406) 
Spouse’s ADL -0.449   
 (0.367)   
ADL*insurance -0.981  -1.828* 
 (0.858)  (1.079) 
ADL*post05 0.224  -0.100 
 (0.819)  (0.598) 
ADL*insurance*post05 0.354  3.133 
 (1.449)  (2.044) 
Constant 6.137*** 6.549*** 6.259*** 
 (0.657) (0.0352) (0.579) 
N 3,134 3,346 3,346 
R-squared 0.206 0.165 0.189 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the household level).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
This finding provides a rough sketch of the evidence that the BLT 
programme also partly contributes to the growth of household 
consumption. Another aspect of the result is that household consumption 
is more sensitive to the income effects of BLT than of Askeskin: without 
controlling for the health shocks covariates, the treatment effect of 
Askeskin decreases dramatically by 5.31 per cent (i.e. 9.47-4.16).
8
 
Nonetheless, we cannot disentangle the channel through which this 
impact occurs. Perhaps the income support component of the BLT 
programme which constitutes an additional in unearned non-labour 
income induces a pure income effect and ultimately loosens the budget 
constraint of the beneficiary households. The second channel may work 
through labour supply. Assuming that leisure is a normal good for the 
beneficiaries, the transfers possibly will produce a reduction in labour 
supply within the participant households. From this direction, we 
                                                          
8
 We also perform a supplementary analysis to test the impact of BLT on the change in 
household consumption. We find that the effects of BLT are insignificant but somewhat larger 
than that of Askeskin. The results are not reported here. 
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understand that the net effect of the programme is ambiguous. Yet this 
relationship is not well-established in developing countries. 
 
6.4 Geographic Disparities: Urban and Rural Areas 
 
So far we have seen that Askeskin cannot completely protect household 
consumption. A seminal contribution in the health policies literature by 
Filmer et al. (2000) sheds light on the weak links that may explain the 
ineffectiveness of health policy interventions in developing countries. 
One possibility is that the public spending is not enough allocated to the 
intervention itself (such as a limited number of health providers) and 
because of highly-fragmented public health infrastructure which its 
availability is concentrated in urban areas of the country (World Bank, 
2007). Another channel is due to a low quality of health care services 
per se. A stark example of this claim is the lack of professionalism 
among health care professionals (e.g. noncompliance with health 
standards and protocols and high rates of absenteeism among the health 
care workforce). Intriguingly, Chomitz et al. (1998) elucidate that the 
real problem in Indonesia also involves the difficulty in staffing (i.e. a 
very high number of unfilled positions for rural health workers).  
 
To deal with this issue, we run two separate regressions, one for the 
urban sample and one for the rural sample. Table 5 displays the findings. 
The treatment effect of Askeskin for the urban area demonstrates that 
the consumption growth of the beneficiary group is approximately 2.87 
per cent lower than the non-beneficiary group (column 1). By contrast, it 
is almost 9.76 per cent for the rural area (column 2). Nevertheless, the 
findings suggest that the impact of Askeskin is not statistically different 
from zero for both groups.  
 
There are contradictory effects of Askeskin on insuring household 
consumption from health shocks. Considering an illness shock one at a 
time, Askeskin does completely protect the consumption changes arising 
from the ADLs changes of urban household heads. Conversely, for the 
rural sample, any illness that affects a head’s ability to function 
physically, such as receiving an Askeskin benefit, has not received full 
protection, but the coefficient gives the wrong sign. 
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Table 5. Heterogeneity tests: urban-rural sample 
 
Variable (1) (2) 
post05 0.338*** 0.163** 
 (0.0827) (0.0778) 
insurance -0.191 -0.219** 
 (0.123) (0.102) 
post05*insurance -0.0287 -0.0976 
 (0.162) (0.143) 
ADL 0.256 0.290 
 (0.635) (0.446) 
ADL*insurance -2.224** 0.0212 
 (1.016) (1.256) 
ADL*post05 -0.411 -0.0104 
 (0.753) (0.861) 
ADL*insurance*post05 3.657** -0.227 
 (1.653) (1.756) 
Constant 5.492*** 6.628*** 
 (0.846) (0.710) 
N 1,892 2,244 
R-squared 0.260 0.146 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the household level).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
What we have learned from our econometric results? A priori, the 
urban-rural treatment effect differences could be attributable to supply-
side problems. There is a long-standing issue that rural areas in 
developing countries are commonly characterised by inadequate and 
inferior quality of health infrastructure or difficulties in reaching health 
facilities. In such settings, the beneficiaries of a social health insurance 
programme are more likely to bypass the benefits of the programme and 
try to find treatment elsewhere (e.g. self-treatment, general medical 
practitioners, etcetera). By doing this, households have to finance their 
own health spending, and this may have serious economic 
consequences, including a change in their consumption patterns.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
This paper has re-examined the theory of consumption smoothing and 
has investigated whether a rapid expansion of social health insurance in 
Indonesia protects household consumption when they are exposed to 
unexpected health shocks. Three measures of health shock are 
employed: a change in illness symptoms, a drop in body mass index, and 
a change in activities of daily living index. 
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The evidence does not contradict the hypothesis of consumption 
insurance, stating that households are able to insure their consumption 
against the negative effect of health shocks. These findings are robust to 
various health measures and different specifications. We interpret these 
results as a indication that there are well-functioning of informal 
insurance within a community in Indonesia.  However, there remains a 
fundamental question of how households in those communities can 
manage to keep their consumption smooth in the presence of illnesses. 
Studying strategies used by households to isolate a certain type of 
idiosyncratic health risks will be a fruitful area for future research.  
 
Another important feature of this study is the treatment effects of 
Askeskin. Our findings demonstrate a marginal effect of Askeksin on 
the growth of household consumption. The result also confirms that the 
programme gives a stronger impact on a change in consumption patterns 
of urban beneficiaries. To be precise, the role of Askeskin in protecting 
household consumption during illness episodes suggests that it can only 
protect urban households. How could such targeted demand-side 
intervention perform far below expectations? A classic explanation will 
point to the supply-side problems. Just like any other developing 
countries, rural areas of Indonesia commonly experience the lack of 
quality and quantity of health infrastructure which contributes to low 
utilization of health care services among the population. Under these 
settings, a social health insurance programme cannot effectively 
improve health service usage. Thus, strengthening supply-side 
interventions is supposed to be the prerequisite condition for enhancing 
the benefits of the social health insurance programme. Yet, a 
comprehensive study on this issue is needed to reveal weak links in the 
chain between the availability of health infrastructure and the 
effectiveness of demand side interventions. 
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